Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for Population Health

Philosophy of Science Seminar

Dates: :	September 14th and September 21st at 3:00 – 5:30pm
Location:	Columbia University

Background:
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation has challenged us to: "...change the questions asked, the methods employed to analyze problems and the range of solutions offered to improve the health of all Americans." In order to accomplish this task, we must work effectively across disciplinary boundaries, disparate research methodologies, and most importantly, dissimilar philosophical approaches to science. The readings and activities within this two-week seminar are selected to motivate critical discussion of the research philosophy that guides our scientific endeavors. During the first week, we are asked to self-examine where we lie on the positivist (objective) spectrum within our approach to science. During the second week, we will continue to discuss not only how our philosophical beliefs shape our research, but also how they affect causal inference, research conclusions, policy recommendations and ultimately population health. This is indeed an ambitious undertaking to be completed in 5 hours, but at the very least we will have better understanding of who we are as individuals and as scientists – a necessary step in the trans-disciplinary work of building a field of population health.

Important Notes:
1) BEFORE you begin reading please answer a brief survey found at:

http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.asp?u=775142541452

2) Since the Weber piece is rather lengthy feel free to stop at page 85. Those who are interested in the entire piece, especially Weber's methodological suggestion of utilizing "ideal types" within research, should continue through page 111.

Week One: Objectivity in the Philosophy of Science
"...we should make manifest our guiding philosophies where they exist, provide them where they do not and thus enable us to put them to the test in the crucible of practicing science."

-- Mervyn Susser

Part I: Is there objectivity in science?
Required Readings:

1. Weber W. "Objectivity" in Social Science and Social Policy. In: Shils EA, ed. The Methodology of the Social Sciences. New York: The Free Press; 1949:49-85.
2. Longino H. Values and Objectivity. In: Science as Social Knowledge. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press; 1990:62-82.
3. Longino H. Values and Science. In: Science as Social Knowledge. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press; 1990:83-102.

Discussion Questions:
Weber p. 56: "One thing is certain under all circumstances, namely, the more "general" the problem involved, i.e., in this case, the broader its cultural significance, the less subject it is to a single unambiguous answer on the basis of data of empirical sciences and the greater the role played by value-ideas and the ultimate and highest personal axioms of belief." Do you agree with Weber on this statement? What are potential ways to becoming more value-free? Should becoming more value-free be our goal as scientists?

Weber p. 72: "There is no absolutely ‘objective' scientific analysis of culture - or put perhaps more narrowly but certainly not essentially differently for our purposes – of ‘social phenomena' independent of special ‘one-sided' viewpoints according to which – expressly or tacitly consciously or unconsciously – they are selected, analyzed and organized for expository purposes." Are sociologists and social epidemiologists by nature of their work less objective than other scientists that do not explore social phenomena, for example, molecular geneticists?

Longino: How do your values shape your research practices, questions, data, and background assumptions? How do the research paradigms within your field that you readily accept, i.e. methodological (qualitative vs. quantitative) and/or conceptual (social vs. biological) influence your research?

Optional Reading:
Weber W. "Objectivity" in Social Science and Social Policy. In: Shils EA, ed. The Methodology of the Social Sciences. New York: The Free Press; 1949:85-111.

Part II: Feminist Critiques of Objectivity in Science
Required Reading:

4. Harding S. "How the Women's Movement Benefits Science: Two Views" in Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Ithaca, NY: Cornell University; 1991;51-76.

Discussion Questions:
Do you agree with Harding that it is impossible, within a society where power is organized hierarchically, to have an Archimedian perspective in science, one that is disinterested, impartial, value-free or detached from the particular historical social relations? Should we strive to achieve this type of objectivity? If we agree with Harding that one can only possess a partial, biased view of reality from the perspective of her (his) position in the social hierarchy, is our solution then to make certain that there are scientists representing different intersections of society (race/ethnicity, class and gender) within science? What are other potential solutions?

Optional Reading:
Haraway D. Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective. Fem Stud. 1988;14(3):575-599.

Week Two: Objectivity and Population Health
"Someone has suggested that any scientist should begin a scientific paper with the phrase: "Ladies and gentlemen, these are the opinions on which I base my facts..."

-- Michael Marmot

Part III: Research Philosophy Implications for Population Health
Required Readings

1. McMullin E. Underdetermination. J Med Philos. 1995;20:233-252.
2. Veatch RM, Stempsey SJ. Incommensurability: Its Implications for the Patient/Physician Relation. J Med Philos. 1995;20:253-269.
3. Bayley C. Our Worlds (May Be) Incommensurable: Now What? J Med Philos. 1995;20:271-284.
4. Weed DL. Underdetermination and Incommensurability in Contemporary Epidemiology. Kennedy Inst Ethics J. 1997;107-124.

Discussion Questions:
If science is encumbered by underdetermination and incommensurability, both of which effect the construction of explanatory theories or causal inference, can we ever determine causality in complex diseases such as cancer and obesity? Can Bagley and Weed's recommendations for scientists to (1) recognize and publicly disclose their value systems, political commitments and world views, and (2) develop general theories of causal inference be effective strategies to circumvent the problem?

Part IV: A Debate: "Objectivity" and Policy Engagement
Required Readings

1. Rothman KJ, Poole C. Science and Policy Making. Am J Public Health. 1985;75(4):340-341.
2. Foxman, B. Epidemiologists and Public Health Policy. J Clin Epidemiol. 1989;42(11):1107-1109.
3. Poole C, Rothman KJ. Epidemiologic Science and Public Health Policy. J Clin Epidemiol. 1990;43(11):1270.
4. Foxman, B. Response: Epidemiologic Science and Public Health Policy. J Clin Epidemiol. 1990;43(11):1270-1271.

Discussion Questions:
Does a scientist's engagement in policy pertaining to her (his) research hinder "objectivity" as argued by Rothman and Poole? If so, how does it hinder objectivity? Should we, as scientists, not engage in policy making so we can, according to Poole and Rothman, safeguard our scientific objectives as much as we can from secular influences?

Other Pertinent Readings:
The following tomes are highly recommended for those who are interested in the seminar sub-topics and would like to explore them some more.

Harding S. The Science Question in Feminism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University; 1986 (For those interested in the feminist perspective)

Kuhn TS. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press; 1962.

Polanyi M. Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press; 1958. (Also highly recommended by Erika)

Quotations were taken from the following sources:

Marmot M. Facts, Opinions and Affairs du Coeur. Am J Epidemiol. 1976;103(6):519-526.

Susser M. Philosophy in Epidemiology. Theor Med. 1991;12:271-273.

Thanks everyone, and if you have any comments or suggestions, please email db2299@columbia.edu.

See you at seminar!

Debbie.